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“Incapacity needs to 
be assessed in the 
real world…”
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The Work Capability Assessment (WCA) – which assesses
eligibility for the main out-of-work disability benefit, Employment
and Support Allowance – is widely seen to be failing. Part of the
problem is how the assessments have been delivered, but even
after Atos is replaced by Maximus, the root problems of the WCA
will remain: the WCA simply does not assess claimants’ capability
for work. 
The main alternative that has been suggested is a ‘real-world
assessment’. This looks at whether a person could actually get or
keep work, given their impairments and given who they are.
However, the Minister for Employment raised concerns about
their fairness, while the official reviewer of the WCA felt that there
was little evidence of what such a test might look like in practice.
This report – the first from the ESRC-funded Rethinking
Incapacity project – meets this challenge by looking at how 
seven other countries assess incapacity. It finds several lessons 
for the UK:
· Real-world assessment is possible – even commonplace
· A standardised real-world test is possible
· We can separate real-world incapacity from unemployment
· Unemployment benefits must also be a ‘safe place’ for
disabled people
It concludes with a series of recommendations for how the new
government in May 2015 can take the steps towards a new
incapacity assessment. Our view is that this should be based on a
real-world idea of incapacity – not for political reasons, but
because it better reflects everyday realities.
Ben Baumberg is a senior lecturer in the School of Social Policy,
Sociology and Social Research (SSPSSR) at the University of
Kent. Jon Warren is a senior research associate in the Department
of Geography, Durham University. Kayleigh Garthwaite is a post-
doctoral research associate in the Department of Geography,
Durham University. Clare Bambra is Professor of Public Health
Geography at Durham University.
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The Rethinking Incapacity
project
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This report is part of a wider three-year research project looking
at how non-medical factors are tangled up in the real world of
incapacity. The project has four strands of work:
· international comparisons of how incapacity assessment works in
other countries
· perceived legitimacy: a new survey and series of deliberative
workshops to look at what people think a fair test looks like
· better data so that we get figures we can trust about the
employment rate of disabled people across time and place
· unequal incapacity: new research into how non-medical factors in
incapacity actually work in practice
The project is led by Ben Baumberg and funded by the
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), with some
strands also involving collaborations with Demos and a team at
the University of Durham led by Professor Clare Bambra – all of
whom have been involved in this report. For more information,
please see www.rethinkingincapacity.org.

Executive summary
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The Work Capability Assessment (WCA) – which assesses
eligibility for the main out-of-work disability benefit,
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) – is a crucial part of
the British benefits system, yet it is widely seen to be failing. Part
of the problem is how the outsourced assessments have been
delivered on the ground, but even after Atos is replaced by
Maximus this year, the root problems of the WCA will remain.
Despite its name, the WCA simply does not assess claimants’
capability for work. It assigns points to functional impairments,
but never considers whether there are any actual jobs that a
claimant could do. Nor does it directly consider whether a
person can undertake work-related activity, or the employment
support that a person might need. It is a standardised test, but
one that consistently measures the wrong thing.
Incapacity, we argue, means that someone’s functional
impairments interfere with their ability to get or keep a job,
given who they are. In the real world, different people are more
or less able to find or keep work despite their impairments; just
because Stephen Hawking is working does not mean that other
people with the same impairments should be considered fit for
work. In practice, qualifications affect the types of jobs you can
do, as do skills, work experience and age, and even the sorts of
jobs that are available in the local labour market. Charities and
disabled people have been calling for these factors to be taken
into account when disabled people are assessed so they have a
‘real-world assessment’. However, the Minister for Employment
raised concerns about the fairness of real-world tests, while the
official reviewer of the WCA felt that there was little evidence of
what such a test might look like in practice.
Lessons for the UK
This report meets this challenge by looking at how other
countries assess incapacity, based on a review of the English-
language literature. It examines three countries that we know use
some form of real-world assessment (Sweden, Denmark and the
Netherlands), and four Anglo-Saxon countries that are most
similar to the UK (US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). We
find five lessons for the UK, which are based on our analysis of
the way these seven countries assess incapacity.
Lesson 1 Real-world assessment is possible – and even
commonplace
In different ways, all of the countries studied in this review –
even the Anglo-Saxon countries – have a form of ‘real-world
assessment’. As the Canadian system states, age, education and
work experience ‘directly affect a person’s ability to work’, and
therefore need to be considered when assessing eligibility for
benefit. It is simply not the case that real-world assessments are
utopian and unworkable; instead, it is the WCA that appears
strange when viewed in an international perspective.
Lesson 2 A standardised real-world assessment is possible
One approach to real-world assessment is to introduce a
discretionary system, but it is difficult to ensure consistency in
any such system. However, the review shows that it is possible 
to marry standardisation with an accurate, real-world 
assessment. The Netherlands and the US both use databases 
of information on the various requirements of different
occupations (functional and educational), which are matched
against the specific capacities and skills of the claimant to
produce a list of occupations that the claimant can realistically
undertake. Potentially, claimants could therefore get a clear
message about why they are being found fit for work, and this
could also provide information needed to design effective return-
to-work strategies.
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Lesson 3 We can separate real-world incapacity from
unemployment
One of the challenges of real-world incapacity assessment is
separating incapacity from unemployment, because in the real
world incapacity is intrinsically linked to employability. In the
face of this problem, there are two ways in which most other
countries have nevertheless maintained a dividing line between
unemployment and incapacity. First, many countries have
emphasised that functional impairments still need to be caused
by medical conditions. Second, it is common to explicitly specify
that local labour demand is not taken into account. These
systems consider real-world factors in the sense that they look at
which jobs a person could realistically carry out, given their
personal characteristics – but not whether there are vacancies for
these jobs at the present time. This addresses one of the key
concerns about the fairness of a real-world assessment.
Lesson 4 Unemployment benefits must also be a ‘safe place’ for
disabled people
Put simply, some genuinely disabled people will not be claiming
incapacity benefits in almost any system. As many as 11.5 million
working-age people have a long-term condition, and many of
these people face genuine disadvantages in the labour market,
even if their disabilities are not sufficient for them to be classified
as entitled to incapacity benefits. Beyond ESA, the rest of the
benefits system must still be a ‘safe place’ for other disabled
people in the support that is given and (if this exists) in the
conditionality that is applied. Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) is not
yet a safe place for disabled people, and this makes the WCA a
higher-stakes and more traumatic assessment than it needs to be.
Lesson 5 It is hard to evaluate the success of incapacity
assessments from other countries
We have written about ‘the lessons from other countries’ – but
we should stress that they are based on what other countries
show to be possible, and we have not proved empirically that
their assessments are successful. This is not because ‘success’ can
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be ignored, but because it is almost impossible to know how
successful other countries’ incapacity assessments are. It is also
clear that no country feels it has cracked the problem of high
incapacity rates in the twenty-first century. Even if no other
countries are currently subject to the outcry over the WCA,
people in most countries have a restless discontentment with
many aspects of their incapacity system.
Our recommendations
These five lessons offer us a starting point for rethinking the
WCA – yet further work is needed to turn them into a blueprint
for implementation. We therefore recommend that the new
government in May 2015 takes the following steps towards a new
incapacity assessment. It should:
Executive summary
· commit to replacing the WCA with a real-world incapacity
assessment
· create a wide-ranging expert panel to develop the new incapacity
test
· undertake study visits to key countries, particularly the US and
the Netherlands
· look at how the public and other key groups respond to any
proposals
· estimate the costs of a new assessment system – but also the
savings that it could generate
· involve disabled people from the outset
The next three years of the Rethinking Incapacity project
will contribute to some of these steps, but academic research can
only do so much in the absence of a wider appetite for change.
There is wide agreement that we have pushed the WCA as far as
we can in making minor tweaks and changing provider, and a
major reform is now needed to restore the system to effectiveness
and legitimacy. Our view is that this reform should be based on a
real-world idea of incapacity – not for political reasons, but
simply because this is what incapacity is, what most people
understand it to be, and what disabled people need to deal with
in the real world. This pamphlet shows that real-world incapacity
is a realistic path, and we hope that the sorely needed review to
overhaul the WCA will similarly begin in the real world of
incapacity, rather than in the false dream of the WCA.
17

1 Introduction
19
The Work Capability Assessment (WCA) – which assesses
eligibility for the main out-of-work disability benefit, ESA – is a
crucial part of the British benefits system, yet it is widely seen to
be failing. Indeed, it has now been failing for some time. As part
of a wider (and continuing) process of reform, the WCA was
introduced in 2008 and rolled out to all claimants from 2010,
such that three-quarters of a million assessments took place in
2013.1 But despite existing on such a scale, the Department for
Work and Pensions’ (DWP’s) own annual independent reviewers
have said that crucial changes are needed to the WCA – and they
have said this every year for the past five years (see below).
Indeed, academics have found that some disabled people live in
outright fear of the DWP’s ‘brown envelope’ calling them to an
assessment, with many claimants saying that the process
damages their health, and there are even anecdotal reports that
the stress of the assessment process has contributed to suicides
among claimants.2 As a result, it appears that every few months
the WCA is condemned by yet another body or group, whether
this be major charities, doctors or disabled people themselves.3
Part of the problem has been the way the assessments have
been delivered on the ground: considerable delays in being seen,
inaccessible centres preventing people from being assessed, and
– once the assessments actually take place – too many poor-
quality assessments (a substantial minority of which are
overturned on appeal; see below). The WCA was initially
outsourced to the multinational company Atos, which had been
providing previous incapacity tests since 1998. However, Atos
was subject to an increasing barrage of criticism, and in March
2014 the DWP announced that Atos had agreed to terminate the
contract early – and indeed, had paid the government to do so,
given the bad publicity and death threats to its staff involved.4
Atos is in the process of being replaced by the US-based
company Maximus, although some disability activists have
raised concerns about fraud and poor performance in Maximus’
provision of (different) outsourced public services in the US.5
But even if Maximus is an improvement on Atos, it is
widely recognised that the root problems of the WCA will
remain. As the Work and Pensions Select Committee recently 
put it,
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The flaws in the existing ESA system are so grave that simply ‘rebranding’
the WCA by taking on a new provider will not solve the problems: a
fundamental redesig n of the ESA end-to-end process is required.6
Similarly, the Labour Party, the Scottish National Party,
and many individual politicians have committed themselves to
fundamentally overhauling the WCA,7 and the final of five DWP-
supported independent reviews of the WCA – established by the
Welfare Reform Act 2007 – has recently come to a similar
conclusion. The reviewer, Dr Paul Litchfield, restricted himself to
diplomatic language, but nevertheless was clearly calling for
radical change:
It appears to me that we have taken the WCA about as far as it can sensibly
go in terms of modification and adjustment. Work and the workforce are
going through a period of unprecedented change and it must be questionable
whether an assessment desig ned in the early part of this century will best
meet society’s needs in its third decade. If any new assessment is desig ned,
the fundamental question of whether health related capability for work is 
the criterion that society wishes to use to determine benefit levels should first
be considered.8
There is therefore much support for an overhaul of the
WCA. What we do not have, though, is much idea of what to
replace it with. The main alternative that has been suggested – a
‘real-world test’ – is an important idea but has not been fleshed
out; the previous independent reviewer of the WCA dismissed it
on the grounds of lack of evidence about how it could be carried
out (see below). Otherwise there are no think tank reports
setting out an alternative vision for the WCA, nor reports by
major disability charities, nor analyses by academics – nearly all
of whom have either been focused on critiquing the WCA and
suggesting only minor amendments, or in the case of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), making suggestions for wholesale reform of the
incapacity benefit system, rather than setting out a blueprint for
replacing the WCA specifically.
As all countries that provide support to those unable to
work because of disability have to assess incapacity at some
point, a good starting point is to look at what other countries
actually do – something we know surprisingly little about.9 In
this Demos pamphlet, we therefore set out to investigate
systematically how seven key countries assess incapacity, and 
the lessons these countries provide for reforming the WCA 
in the UK. Before going into the international review, however,
we first set out the state of the UK’s existing assessment in 
more detail, and why the review focuses on the idea of a ‘real-
world assessment’.
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2 The system as it stands
23
As one of us argued in a recent Demos Quarterly,10 despite its
name, the WCA simply does not assess a person’s work
capability. To understand these failings of the WCA, we need to
go into the detail of the test.
What the WCA assesses, and what it does not
While the ESA system as a whole is reasonably complex, the
WCA is a simple test at heart. It consists of a checklist of
different possible impairments in different categories, which all
have a certain number of points attached to them. If those who
are being assessed score 15 points in total across the whole test,
they are awarded ESA. An example of the manual dexterity test
is shown in table 1.11
Table 1 Example of the scoring for the WCA’s manual 
dexterity test
Descriptor Points
Cannot either: (i) press a button, such as a telephone 
keypad; or (ii) turn the pages of a book with either hand. 15 
Cannot pick up a £1 coin or equivalent with either hand. 15 
Cannot use a pen or pencil to make a meaningful mark. 9 
Cannot single-handedly use a suitable keyboard or mouse. 9 
So persons who cannot pick up a £1 coin, cannot press a
button, or cannot turn the pages of a book score 15 points and
are awarded ESA. Those who cannot use a pen or pencil score
only nine points – and unless they have another impairment, or
meet one of the ‘special’ or ‘exceptional’ conditions,12 they are
considered fit for work.
This test is clear and simple in principle – the trouble is
that it does not assess work capacity. It is quite difficult to find 
a clear statement of what the WCA is designed to measure; 
but in the words of the DWP’s Technical Working Group who
designed the test, the WCA ‘focuses solely on people’s level of
function’,13 which is not the same as incapacity. To explain why 
it is different, it is worth clarifying at this point exactly what
‘work capacity’ means.
Policy makers worldwide have long dreamed about a
definitive medical assessment of incapacity, where the most
trusted of professionals – doctors – scientifically determine
people’s capacity for work.14 Yet this is a chimera, which disabled
people and disability experts dismissively refer to as the old-
fashioned ‘medical model’. Instead, the insight of the ‘social
model’ is that disability depends on how the world is organised,
and whether society itself ‘disables’ people with functional
impairments. When it comes to the workplace, few medical
diagnoses or functional impairments are so severe that you
cannot do any jobs whatsoever; in the LSE-founder Sidney
Webb’s words in 1912, ‘incapable of any work whatsoever’ can
only mean ‘literally unconscious or asleep’.15 For everyone else,
incapacity depends on whether your limitations interfere with
the requirements of the particular job in question. And this goes
beyond the bounds of medical science.
According to best practice in occupational health,16 the
starting point of any credible assessment should therefore be to
compare people’s impairments with the requirements of work.
Yet while vaguely being related to work,17 at no stage does the
WCA assess the work that a claimant may or may not be able to
do. The WCA is a standardised, seemingly objective, assessment,
but this comes at the cost of failing to measure what it purports
to; it could be better thought of as a measure of ‘whether a
person should be required to seek work’, rather than actually
measuring incapacity.18
The system as it stands
Real-world incapacity
There is also a second sense in which the WCA does not assess
work incapacity: it ignores people’s differing abilities to find or
keep a job they can do. One of us has previously called this the
‘Stephen Hawking effect’: just because Stephen Hawking is
working does not mean that other people with the same
impairments should be considered fit for work. Likewise, an
impairment that is unproblematic for a 25-year-old graduate in
the more buoyant labour market in the south-east of England
may be an insurmountable barrier to work for a 63-year-old man
with no qualifications in the more depressed local economy of
Easington, County Durham. Incapacity assessments that take
this into account have recently been termed ‘real-world
assessments’,19 on the grounds that they look at whether a person
with impairments would realistically be able to find a job they
can do, given who they are.
However, ‘real-world assessments’ should be seen as a
family of assessments rather than a single model. Most versions
of real-world assessment would look at personal factors such as
age, education and qualifications, and work experience. In
principle, though, it would be possible to have real-world
assessments that also consider the local labour market, the
national economic situation, or other barriers to work such as
caring responsibilities, all of which influence whether a person
with an impairment is able to get or keep a suitable job. There
are good reasons why some of these factors are more desirable in
an incapacity assessment than others, and we explore them
below. Another approach is to look at what we might call
‘demonstrated incapacity’, where a person’s inability to find work
is shown in the real world over a sustained period of time.
To reiterate: real-world assessment looks at whether someone’s
functional impairments interfere with their ability to get or keep a job,
given who they are. It therefore intrinsically takes into account
functional impairments alongside the non-medical factors (such
as employability) that make it easier or harder for different
people to work.
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Challenges for real-world assessment
To the extent that people have advocated a firm alternative to the
WCA, they have been advocating for a real-world type of test.
This includes the Spartacus Network of disabled people and a
number of charities led by Citizens’ Advice,20 and it has even
been discussed by the DWP’s independent reviewers of the
WCA. The first reviewer, Prof Malcolm Harrington, gave it
serious consideration in his annual review in 2010, while his
successor, Dr Paul Litchfield, strongly hinted he favoured a
version of real-world assessment in the final independent review:
The system as it stands
The current assessment model, though founded on capability rather than
diag nosis, retains a strong medical flavour. Modern thinking favours a
biopsychosocial21 model of disability, which considers not just capability but
also other factors such as skills and readiness for the labour market.22
But it is not that simple. As one of us has described in a
recent Demos Quarterly,23 there are a number of challenges in
introducing real-world assessments in the real world. First, as
Chris Grayling MP (then Minister of State for Employment) said
in 2011:
The one thing I am absolutely unreservedly and implacably opposed to in all
of this is a real world test. Either somebody is fit for work or they are not,
and what I am not prepared to do is to countenance a situation where we
are saying: ‘You are fit for work, but you should not be on JSA because there
is high unemployment in your area.’... What I do not think we could
possibly countenance is the situation where we are saying, ‘Because of
circumstances in the labour market in your area, we will treat you
differently. I think that would be a huge mistake.’24
Grayling seemed to be arguing that it does not seem fair
and right that the same people in different areas of the country
are treated differently – a view we have heard across the political
spectrum. However, this only applies to spatially specific tests
(where local labour markets are taken into account); part of the
problem with these debates has been that the various different
meanings of the ‘real-world’ element have been blurred. We
return to this explicitly in our concluding chapter.
Second, the idea of a real-world test has been advocated,
but no one has provided any detail about what a real-world test
might actually look like. At the request of Citizens Advice,
Professor Richard Berthoud produced an excellent analysis of
the issues,25 but with little guidance as to the practicalities of
real-world assessments. The independent reviewer of the WCA at
the time, Malcolm Harrington, thus concluded that the UK’s
collected experts were ‘unable to offer clear, evidence based
advice on what a real world test might look like’.26
One worry here is that a real-world test could blur into
unemployment insurance. For spatially specific tests in
particular, unemployed people in areas with few jobs will have a
low bar to claiming incapacity benefits, even if their impairment
is not the reason that they are out of work. It is widely believed
that GPs were willing to sign people off sick with only minor
health limitations in deindustrialising areas in Britain in the
1980s (though there is no direct available evidence to confirm it),
as well as in other countries such as the Netherlands, where levels
of incapacity claims rose to unprecedented levels. While this
challenge arises primarily because of the nature of incapacity –
an impairment is genuinely more incapacitating for people who
have lower employability – real-world tests still need to
demonstrate that they can meaningfully differentiate incapacity
from unemployment.
A real-world test is therefore an attractive idea, but we need
to know more about if and how it can work before it can be seen
as a real alternative to the WCA. These are the questions that this
report tries to answer.
The functions of the WCA
The WCA is currently failing in its task of assessing incapacity,
but this is not its only function. Potentially, an incapacity
assessment could also influence both the conditionality and the
employment support that claimants receive – yet the WCA fails
on both of these counts too.
27
Conditionality and the WCA
Aside from determining eligibility for ESA, the WCA splits
claimants into two groups based on their ‘capability for work-
related activity’. Those who are assessed as having this capability
are placed in the Work-Related Activity Group (WRAG), and are
forced to attend regular work-focused interviews and perform
other work-related activity (voluntary work, work trials, or
training) – otherwise they are sanctioned. Alternatively, those
assessed as not having a ‘capability for work-related activity’ are
placed in the Support Group, whose members not only have no
conditionality, but are also awarded a higher level of benefit,
which (unlike for the WRAG group) is not means-tested after 12
months. This second-stage assessment therefore has high stakes,
and it has been subject to considerable controversy and revision.
The actual ‘work-related activity’ capability test is based on
the ‘work’ capability test – it uses the same descriptors – but has
two main differences.27 First, multiple less severe impairments do
not ‘add up’ to a more severe impairment; the ‘work-related
activity’ capability test only assesses the most severe impairment
that a person has. Second, there are several impairments that are
considered reason alone for limited work capability, but are still
not sufficient to count as limited capability for ‘work-related
activity’ at the second stage. For example, people are eligible for
ESA if they ‘cannot pick up a £1 coin or equivalent with either
hand’, but if this was their only impairment, they would be
placed in the WRAG rather than the support group. (We briefly
return to the issue of conditionality in JSA and Universal Credit
in chapter 4.)
There has been much confusion about why people are
placed in the WRAG rather than the support group. Partly this is
because the Coalition Government introduced a one-year time
limit for WRAG claimants that took effect in 2012, arguing that
the WRAG was ‘an interim measure for those who are expected
to move into work’,28 and partly it is because WRAG claimants
receive a ‘prognosis’ of when they are expected to be fit for work,
which governs entry into the Work Programme. As a result, it is
often assumed that people are meant to be put in the WRAG if
they are expected to be ready to return to work in the near
future, and it is on these grounds that five charities complained
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that those with progressive conditions are sometimes wrongly
allocated to the WRAG.29 Yet we believe the confusion is also
because the ‘work-related activity’ test is not very closely related
to people’s ability to undertake work-related activity, mirroring
the problems of the work capability test in assessing incapacity.
Employment support and the WCA
Beyond such ‘eligibility assessments’, the WCA also misses an
opportunity to conduct a ‘diagnostic assessment’30 of the
support that claimants need to get back to work. These
assessments are necessary to determine how much money Work
Programme providers are given (which currently is crudely based
on which benefits people have received) and for providing
claimants with personalised support to help them return to work,
which should happen as early as possible in a person’s claim. Yet
the WCA does not attempt to provide any information on the
work that people could do, or the help they would need to return
to work. Jobcentre Plus conducts separate needs assessments
with new claimants, but these are not consistent and do not
provide the detailed information required. In practice, Work
Programme providers therefore make their own assessments after
clients are referred to them – a situation that seems unlikely to
change even with the Government’s proposed introduction of a
new ‘Gateway’ assessment for disability employment support.31
There are good reasons to split diagnostic and eligibility
assessments – diagnostic assessments need to focus on what
people can do and what support they need rather than their
eligibility for benefit,32 and there are certain factors (such as
motivation) that are critical in assessing employment support
needs but which we would not want to take into account in
determining benefit eligibility. An international review has found
that many countries therefore separate these two processes out.33
However, incapacity assessment could certainly contribute much
more to this process, both in influencing contractual payment
levels for employment support, and in providing the information
required to personalise support. There have been several calls by
think tanks, disability charities and politicians, and the
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independent reviewer of the WCA to capture more of this
information at the time of the WCA.34 But as it stands, Work
Programme providers cannot even see the information on
functional impairments that the WCA does provide (much as the
DWP is promising to change this in 2015).
This was foreseen when ESA was being designed, and a
further Work Focusing Health-Related Assessment (WFHRA)
was proposed from the outset. The WFHRA was a second
assessment carried out by Atos in the early years of ESA,
originally by the same assessor as the WCA on the same day, and
focused on the claimant’s views of the support that would help
them move back to work. However, the WFHRA was suspended
in July 2010, after a review found that neither claimants nor
Jobcentre staff were clear about its purpose. We are left with a
situation in which many experts are calling for an early
assessment to look at claimants’ employment support needs,
eight years after the original WCA design team thought they had
addressed this issue.
Could we do without an incapacity assessment?
There is no realistic way of avoiding all disability-related
assessments in the welfare state – disabled people have higher
costs to reach the same standard of living, and we therefore need
extra cost benefits (DLA or PIP) to avoid high levels of
disability-related poverty.35 But beyond this, and given the
unpopularity of the WCA, some people have proposed a world
without any further incapacity assessments. One version would
be to have a single flat-rate, out-of-work benefit, with disabled
people compensated through a more generous extra costs benefit
(as Demos argues in the 2013 report Something for Something36), in
which conditionality and employment support could be
personalised. Alternatively, some disability advocates argue in
favour of a basic income, in which the issue of conditionality
would not arise.
We think that these ideas are problematic – even if some
countries have started to move in this direction. It is possible to
offer personalised support rather than support via a separate
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category of ‘disability’, but in practice this would lead to lower
levels of support and worse outcomes for disabled people,37 and
there is still a need to assess how much money a welfare-to-work
provider will be given to support each claimant. It is more
plausible to imagine a world with a single flat-rate, out-of-work
benefit in which conditionality and employment support needs
are assessed through a lower-stakes incapacity test. However,
there are 600,000 longer-term ESA claimants not receiving an
extra cost benefit in the UK, who would suffer considerable
losses in such a reform (or if they were compensated by
extending eligibility to a universal disability extra costs benefit,
then the total cost would be much greater). And in the long
term, disabled people are also often thought of as more
‘deserving’ than unemployment benefit claimants, and their
benefits are more generous.38 Abandoning the category of
‘incapacity’ will eventually result in a reduction in the popularity
and generosity of support for disabled people.
Incapacity assessment developed in many countries during
the twentieth century to meet a societal need, and if anything we
believe this need has grown. In our view, the challenge is how to
make it work better than the WCA does at present.
The accuracy of the WCA
The WCA is widely perceived to be an inaccurate measure of
incapacity, and we have good reasons for thinking that it is
assessing the wrong thing – but actually estimating the accuracy
of the WCA is difficult.39 As it was being developed, the WCA
was tested in 212 cases, but as an article in the British Medical
Journal noted at the time, ‘the new test claims to be fair and
accurate, but the report does not define what this means’.40 In
fact, it was being assessed against ‘expert opinion’, without
telling us what the experts were actually assessing, and without
considering that expert opinion can be wrong. A similar problem
besets the more recent DWP’s ‘evidence-based review’, which
compared 600 WCAs against the opinion of a group of experts.
This time we were told that the expert panel ‘identified that 
83 per cent of claimants deemed fit for work would need “on
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average, two or three” adjustments; 50 per cent would need
flexible working hours; and 24 per cent would need a support
worker’.41 While we still do not exactly know what the expert
panel was assessing, it is clear that it was looking at people’s
ability to perform a generic job with a considerable level of
adjustments, which is perhaps stricter than many people’s idea 
of ‘incapacity’.
In the absence of an easy measure of accuracy,
commentators have tended to focus on successful WCA appeals
as a measure of inaccuracy.42 In the early days of the WCA,
nearly half of those found fit for work appealed – over one-
quarter of the total caseload – and over 40 per cent of these
decisions were being overturned by the tribunals. Freedom of
information requests revealed that the majority of decisions that
were overturned at this time had initially received zero points
rather than being marginal decisions.43 However, the numbers of
appeals have since collapsed, from between 40,000 and 110,000
per quarter in 2009–2013, to around 10,000 per quarter over the
last year. While there are several possible reasons for this, the
main one is probably the introduction of ‘mandatory
reconsideration’, 44 which acts as a strong disincentive for people
to appeal, and may mean that many wrong decisions are no
longer being challenged.
It is impossible to talk about the WCA, though, without
looking at how the WCA outcomes have changed over time. At
the start of ESA in late 2008, over half of those undergoing a
WCA were eventually found fit for work after taking into
account appeals, with 35 per cent being placed in the WRAG,
and 11 per cent in the support group. By early 2013 these figures
had changed dramatically, with only 33 per cent being found fit
for work, 23 per cent being placed in the WRAG, and 44 per cent
in the support group.45 Partly this reflects changes to the WCA
in January 2013 and particularly March 2011, which were
designed to increase the numbers going into the support group.
However, it also reflects changes that were not predicted, in
particular around the use of the discretionary special
circumstances regulation where people are considered to be at a
substantial risk of harm if found fit for work.46 The Treasury’s
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budget-by-budget estimates of spending on ESA have therefore
continually been revised upwards, and there is a possibility that
new changes to ESA will be unveiled to reduce spending back to
its originally projected levels.
There are two implications of this. First, the WCA that was
introduced in 2008 is a very different beast from the WCA that is
now being implemented, and some of the concerns that have
been raised may fade away as people become aware of the
changes. Yet while it is possible to make the test more or less
generous, the charge that we are making – that the test simply
does not assess people’s capacity for work – cannot be addressed
without a fundamental overhaul of the WCA. Second, these
changes demonstrate how a system set out in legislation can be
affected by changing street-level practices (much as some of the
changes over time have been underpinned by statutory
instruments). This review concentrates on systems and
principles, but we must always remember that the way that these
are implemented in practice is no less important, much as this is
harder to look at across different countries.
Rethinking the WCA using international evidence
While this review is focused on learning from international
evidence, before looking at that evidence it was first necessary to
understand the WCA as it currently stands. This chapter has
therefore set out why the WCA fails to assess incapacity, how it
links poorly to conditionality and employment support, and
what we know about the accuracy of the WCA (and how this has
changed over time). We now turn to the main focus of our
review: the next chapter describes how other countries have
designed their incapacity assessment, while the concluding
chapter brings our findings together into lessons for rethinking
the WCA.
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3 International case
studies
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In our review we chose to look at two sets of countries. We look
at four Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand
and the US), which in many ways have welfare systems that are
most similar to the UK. To complement this, we also look at
three social democratic countries (Denmark, the Netherlands
and Sweden). These are countries that we knew consider real-
world incapacity in some way, and invest substantially in issues
around work and disability and might therefore contain some
examples of best practice. These are also the countries that seem
to be influential in UK debate; they include the four countries
mentioned in Dr Litchfield’s review, and most of the countries
that underpin the call for real-world assessment in the recent
Spartacus report.47
The rest of this chapter presents short summaries of
incapacity assessment in each of these countries. We should
however stress that it is always challenging in UK-based
international reviews to obtain the level of detail we would like
on the latest reforms, particularly for the social democratic
countries where most policy documents are not available in
English. We have attempted to triangulate our understanding
across a range of sources within each country, but there are some
areas where uncertainty remains – we make clear below where
this is the case.
New Zealand48
When Dr Paul Litchfield was drawing on international evidence
for his recent independent review of the WCA, he was
particularly interested in the lessons from New Zealand.
Ironically, policy makers in New Zealand in recent years have
been inspired by the UK’s approach, and this cautions us against
celebrating international examples before it is clear if they were
successful – the latest New Zealand reforms date from 2013, and
it will be a few years before we get a clear picture how they work
(as Litchfield himself notes). Still, the broad outlines of the
system are clear.
Incapacity benefits
New Zealand operates two benefits:
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· Supported Living Payment (SLP): A dedicated incapacity benefit
for those with severe disabilities, with no conditionality applied.
However, people cannot receive this until they have had a
condition affecting their work capacity for two years (unless they
are terminally ill or blind). Even after two years, SLP is only
available for those who are incapable of part-time work.
· Jobseeker’s Support: All other claimants for incapacity benefit are
placed on the main out-of-work benefit, Jobseeker’s Support,
which is paid at a flat rate (with variations by age and family
size); SLP pays 25 per cent more than Jobseeker’s Support. Sick
or disabled claimants of Jobseeker’s Support are placed in one of
two groups: the mild work capacity limitation group (able to do
part-time work of 15–29 hrs/wk), and the severe work capacity
limitation group (not fit for part-time work). Obligations are
placed on all sick and disabled claimants (other than blind or
terminally ill people) in the first two years, and these are more
stringent than in the UK: those with mild work capacity
limitations have a seemingly onerous set of part-time work
obligations, while even those with severe limitations who are
often described as having a ‘temporary exemption’ from work
requirements nevertheless have ‘work preparation obligations’.
Assessment of eligibility
What is particularly striking is that the incapacity assessment 
is based on a remarkably simple Work Capacity Medical
Certificate filled out by the claimant’s medical practitioner (like
the UK in the past), paid for by the claimant where necessary.
The form asks about the level and duration of incapacity 
directly (eg whether the claimant’s medical conditions ‘limit 
the person’s capacity to work for 30 hours or more per week’ and,
if so, how long this will last), with little further guidance
provided, other than stating that work is good for health. Benefit
eligibility is then decided by benefits agency staff, based on the
form alongside their interactions with the client and the clients’
self-assessment.
However, benefits agency staff can refer a claimant for a
second opinion, on the grounds that the information from the
form is unclear or ambiguous, the initial doctor feels
inadequately qualified, the claimant wants a second opinion, or
because the benefits agency staff think that ‘the person is
engaged in activities that appear to be at odds with recorded
incapacities or with work capacity information’. Technically, the
independent doctor can be selected by the claimant, but in
practice it seems that the agency suggests people from its
‘designated doctors’ list. People can go to the Medical Appeals
Board if they are unhappy with the decision; this is made up of
medical and rehabilitation professionals chosen by the Ministry,
and there is no further right of appeal.
Lessons for the UK
It is very difficult to assess how well the new system is working –
partly because it is so new, and partly because the level of
transparency is poor; for example, New Zealanders themselves
complain that no statistics are routinely published on appeals or
sanctions. And even knowing how the system looks on paper, the
high degree of discretion that seems to be given to the benefits
agency makes it difficult to know how strict the eligibility testing
is, or how often sanctions are applied. However, official data that
try to compare the pre- and post-reform systems show that
Jobseeker’s Support claims have fallen since the July 2013
reforms (from 129,000 to 123,000), but Supported Living
Payment claims have increased (from 84,000 to 85,000). Nearly
half of all claimants of Jobseeker’s Support are currently
classified as having a health condition or disability.
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As a final word, it is worth considering the WCA
independent reviewer Paul Litchfield’s comments on New
Zealand. Litchfield was interested in ‘the approach of
uncoupling levels of benefit eligibility from work capability’ and
their focus ‘on overcoming barriers to employment’, which he
says ‘has appeal and merits further exploration’. However, the
benefit eligibility assessment above is not a helpful measure of
employment support needs. (This instead needs to be assessed in
an entirely separate ‘WCA’ with an independent medical
specialist, which Jobseeker’s Support claimants can be forced to
undergo.) Far from being an innovative new example, this in fact
takes us back to the original ESA system of the WFHRA (see
chapter 2), and it is not clear that the New Zealand system offers
any ‘real-world’ lessons that the UK has not already learnt.
Australia49
Incapacity benefits
New Zealand’s system seems to have been partly inspired by
Australia’s, which since 2006 has likewise had a distinction
between a low-level general out-of-work benefit (the Newstart
Allowance) and a dedicated incapacity benefit that pays 50 per
cent more (the Disability Support Pension, DSP). Many sick and
disabled people are not eligible for DSP for three reasons. First,
DSP is only for people who cannot work part-time (15+ hrs/wk).
Second, DSP is only for people with a ‘continuing inability for
work’ lasting two or more years into the future. Third, since 2011,
nearly everyone applying for DSP has to show that they have
already ‘actively participated’ in a programme of support for 18
months, with exceptions only for ‘severely disabled’ people.50
This means that people who are temporarily disabled, or whose
disability makes them unable to work full time, or indeed most
disabled people in the first 18 months of their claim, are only
eligible for Newstart Allowance. Partly as a consequence, around
half of Newstart Allowance claimants are exempt from jobsearch
requirements at any one time.
International case studies
Assessment of eligibility
The assessment for DSP is known as the Job Capacity
Assessment (JCA), and is made by job capacity assessors
employed by the Department of Human Services, based on a
medical or functioning report by the claimant’s doctor. The JCA
includes both an impairment table and an assessment of
‘continuing inability to work’. The impairment table is a
functional capacity test that is not dissimilar to the WCA, with
claimants needing to score 20 points to be eligible for DSP. The
‘continuing inability to work’ test assesses whether someone is
unable to work 15+ hrs/wk, and whether this will last two years –
‘work’ meaning any job paying the minimum wage in Australia.
The assessment explicitly states that the availability of work is
not considered, nor are people’s other employability barriers (eg
literacy difficulties) unrelated to their medical condition, or how
employers would react to them. However, there are some small
elements of a real-world test. The ‘physical and intellectual
characteristics which would be required to perform any work’ are
explicitly considered, as is a person’s ability to re-skill into a
different occupation within two years.
Lessons for the UK
Dr Litchfield’s view was that Australia could offer lessons to the
UK as the JCA is ‘used to identify barriers to work an individual
may face and refer for appropriate support’. Indeed, the JCA
formally commits itself to establishing a claimant’s ‘barriers to
finding and maintaining employment and any interventions or
assistance that may be required to help improve their current
work capacity’, with the reports sent on to their employment
services provider. This information comes from the second part
of the test (the impairment tables in the first part are similar to
the WCA), and the main lesson is therefore that a WCA-style test
can be accompanied by a further simultaneous assessment of
what work an individual can actually do – a lesson that we will
see repeated for several further countries.51
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Denmark52
Incapacity benefits
Denmark has a relatively long-lasting and generous sickness
benefit, followed by a disability pension (‘Fortidspension’). The
most distinctive feature of the system though is the much-cited
flex-job (‘Fleksjob’) scheme, which provides substantial wage
subsidies – often over half of the wage – to sick and disabled
people. After being introduced in 2003, the numbers of people
in flex-jobs has increased considerably; the overall number of
sickness and disability claimants has not reduced, but the
employment rate of people with health problems has increased.
One problem is that fewer flex-jobs are available than the
numbers who are eligible for them, with people being paid a
waiting benefit (at the same level as sickness benefit and
unemployment benefit) while waiting; there have also been
recent attempts to restrict eligibility to the scheme.
Assessment of eligibility
Health limitations are initially assessed by the claimant’s GP,
before being reviewed by a municipality medical adviser who can
ask a specialist for a second opinion. However, the actual
assessment process is carried out by a social worker employed by
the municipality, who uses something called the ‘resource profile’
when making a decision. This looks at 12 diverse dimensions of
the claimant’s situation: education and skills, labour market
experience, interests, social competence, re-adjustment ability,
learning ability, job preferences, performance expectations, work
identity, dwelling and finances, social network and health. In the
UK, Dr Litchfield approvingly stressed how only one part of the
profile concerns health, and – much as health is reported to be a
critical factor in 95 per cent of cases – this again highlights the
non-medical, ‘real-world’ elements in assessment.
Having completed the resource profile, the social worker
then decides whether the claimant can perform a normal job or a
flex-job, giving the social worker some discretion – although less
than existed in the past. If claimants can carry out a normal job
they are ineligible for the benefit; if they can take on a flex-job
they wait for a suitable flex-job to become available; and if they
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cannot perform a flex-job they receive the disability pension. Few
claimants are rejected from incapacity-related benefits outright,
but few seem to be eligible for the disability pension at the outset
(and indeed most under-40s have recently been barred from
claiming it). The relevant legislation requires that early
retirement pensions are only granted when other options are
exhausted, hence social workers will try a number of different
activation activities before someone is considered completely
incapable for even subsidised work.
This was the picture for much of the past decade – but in
2013 the process of assessment was overhauled into an
assessment tool called the Resource Cycle (‘Ressourceforløb’),
following several years of pilots. Rather than starting with the
claimant’s GP, this starts with an interview with a ‘return-to-work
coordinator’ (basically a sickness benefit officer), who maps the
claimant’s employment situation and completes a screening of
their support needs. Where an in-depth work capacity
assessment is required, the coordinator sets up a
multidisciplinary conference between an occupational therapist,
a psychologist and a psychiatrist, which focuses on what the
person can do (how many hours someone can work, from what
date, and with what accommodations), and what barriers need to
be addressed (which can lead to appointments with a
psychologist to address work motivation, or with the employer to
address workplace barriers). Little English-language information
is available on either the workings or the successes of the new
system, other than early reports that local authorities were
struggling to deliver the initiative as intended.
Lessons for the UK
Both the Spartacus review and the Litchfield review discuss the
Danish system, partly because ‘Denmark has long been
considered to be a European exemplar for how best to handle
sickness and disability-related issues in employment’.53 However,
this appears to be changing. Having flagged use of the Resource
Profile as potential best practice, the OECD recently concluded
that the Resource Profile ‘is now considered a failure’ in practice,
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because of its complexity, lack of guidance, lack of integration
with employment support and its failings in assessing mental
health limitations.54 The latest reforms thus introduce yet
another assessment process that is simpler and focused more on
linking to employment support, as well as cutting the totemic
flex-jobs scheme. Still, the Danish system is the first here to
demonstrate that systems can substantially take real-world factors
into account.
Sweden55
Incapacity benefits
In Sweden, people who are not working because of ill-health or
disability claim a relatively generous sickness benefit
(‘Sjukpenning’), which since 2008 takes them into a clearly
defined process aiming to get them back to work. Those
employed at the time of sickness or disability often have a
meeting with an assessor (and often their employer, doctor
and/or rehabilitation specialist) within 90 days to see if or how
they can return to work; this both checks their eligibility for
benefit and investigates options for workplace adjustments. If
they are still on sickness benefit after 180 days, then they have to
start looking at other jobs they might do with help from the
public employment service. It is only if incapacity is considered
permanent (often after long periods claiming sickness benefit)
that some claimants move on to the permanent disability benefit
(‘Sjukersättning’); or if they are under 30, to the less permanent
activity compensation, (‘Aktivitetsersättning’), which either the
individual or their caseworker applies for.
Assessment of eligibility
Within this process, functional ability is assessed by the
caseworker based on reports from the claimant’s doctor, but the
state insurance agency can undertake its own in-house
assessments using its team of work life psychologists,
occupational therapists and social welfare supervisors. Formally,
the state insurance agency caseworkers are assessing whether the
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claimant has any ‘functional impairments that entail reduced
work capacity’, which it can determine as being 25 per cent, 50
per cent, 75 per cent, or total incapacity. This is not defined in
law, but internal documents state that ‘work capacity is
determined by the interplay of a job seeker’s individual
characteristics, a specific work task, and the work environment’ –
and this also involves looking at the jobs that a person might
actually be able to get. As Garsten and Jacobsson put it, ‘it is not
enough to test work capacity in relation to a fictional labour
market. The public employment service has to try to find an
actual existing job for the person in question.’56
Lessons for the UK
The lessons from Sweden are therefore similar to those from
Denmark: incapacity assessment can be tightly linked to
employment support, and it can also consider real-world factors
in terms of both personal characteristics and demonstrated
incapacity (where real-world failures to find work while on
sickness benefits are used by claimants and caseworkers to argue
they have a permanently reduced ability to work). Where
Sweden differs, though, is that it is seen as a success story by the
OECD after the ‘remarkable fall’ in sickness and disability claims
over the past ten years. The price to be paid for this is a high
benefit rejection rate, which has led even the OECD to note that
there are ‘concerns that the disability system may have become
too strict’.
One further feature is worth noting, as it is so unusual: the
existence of a category of ‘socio-medical disability’. This is not
caused by a medically diagnosed condition, but instead reflects
non-medical workplace disadvantages, such as a criminal
background or Swedish language difficulties among immigrants.
To understand why this make sense, we need to look at the
context: insurance agency staff choose to classify someone as
‘disabled’ in order to access more generous support that they
need to get someone back into work. Classifying someone as
socio-medically disabled has been seen as a way of levelling out
an unequal labour market, even if they have no health conditions
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in a medical sense. This deliberate blurring of unemployment
and incapacity offers a revealing contrast with other countries’
focus on their separation.
Canada57
Incapacity benefits
The Canadian system is fiendishly complex: disabled people
have to navigate between six and eight income support
programmes split between private insurers, federal government,
and the provincial governments. We focus on the federal system
(outside Quebec), which is split between a very short-term
sickness benefit of up to 15 weeks, and the main Canada Pension
Plan disability benefit (CPP-D). Both of these are restricted to
people who have strong work attachments in the past few years,
so around half of disabled claimants instead receive the disability
component of provincial non-contributory Social Assistance.
Assessment of eligibility
Incapacity within CPP-D is assessed by a medical adjudicator
employed by the government department, Social Development
Canada, with decisions made by a separate insurance officer.
They assess whether the claimants have a ‘severe and prolonged
disability’, each part of which is assessed separately:58
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· The simplest part, ‘disability’, just means that a person has 
a medical condition. The medical adjudicator will use all 
of the evidence that they can get, including contacts with the
client, reports by employers or schools and so on, only request-
ing an independent specialist’s assessment in particularly
difficult cases.
· The ‘prolonged’ criterion further restricts CPP-D to those whose
disabilities are likely to result in death, or are likely to be long
continued (with no possibility of working within a year) and of
indefinite duration (they have no fixed date when they could
return to work).
· The ‘severe’ criterion means that the disability prevents the
claimant ‘from regularly pursuing any substantially gainful
occupation’. This means the claimant’s disability stops them
from performing all of the tasks required in a job, or from doing
enough work in a given period of time to meet a typical job
description. It does this ‘regularly’ if the limitations are
continuous, though episodic, cyclical and recurring medical
conditions can all be considered continuous if they seem to
prevent people from working over an extended period of time.
Most crucially of all, ‘any occupation’ does not mean
literally any occupation nationally, unlike in, say Australia.
Instead, it means ‘an occupation in which a person might
reasonably be expected to be employed’, and explicitly takes into
account three personal characteristics that ‘directly affect a
person’s ability to work’:
· Age: ‘With increasing age there is a gradual reduction in the
reserve capacity of most body organs. This can affect a person’s
ability to recover from injury or illness and his or her ability to
sustain work.’
· Education: ‘Generally speaking, the more education an individual
has the more likely it is that the person will be able to do some
form of work.’
· Work experience: ‘Skills acquired in a previous job or jobs may
enable a person to find other work that is suitable to the person’s
limitations and restrictions.’59
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Yet these personal characteristics are sharply distinguished
from ‘socio-economic conditions’ (such as local labour demand)
that are explicitly ignored, as confirmed in case law. The federal
agency further stresses that people’s lack of work must be partly
because of their disability, with the adjudicator having to look at a
wide range of evidence to see if this is more likely than not (eg
looking at their work history before and after the development of
the disability).
Lessons for the UK
This is the clearest statement we have seen so far about how
some real-world factors in incapacity can be included while
others are excluded. This comes despite the considerable flaws of
the Canada system, which even the OECD sees as especially
strict, and which leave many people to try and self-insure
privately against the risk of disability. The example of Canada
further shows that real-world assessments are not necessarily
generous, and more generally that the type of assessment is
different from its generosity, as we also see when comparing the
superficially similar systems in Sweden and Denmark.
The United States60
Incapacity benefits
For those who stereotype the US system as providing
stigmatised, residualised welfare payments, the detail of the US
incapacity system will come as something of a shock. In fact,
incapacity benefits fall on the other side of the ‘welfare’ vs ‘social
security’ divide that dominates US income transfers, and social
security payments are relatively generous, with a broad political
constituency of support to defend them. The two main federal
Social Security Administration incapacity benefits are the more
generous contributions-based Disability Insurance (DI), and for
those who do not quality, the means-tested Supplemental
Security Income (SSI). DI has a five-month waiting period that
is intended to allow people to recover from short-term illnesses
(as well as act as a disincentive for those who can work), but SSI
is theoretically payable for the month following the application,
much as there are delays in practice.
Assessment of eligibility
There is a single disability determination process for both 
DI and SSI, which is managed by the Social Security
Administration and decided by Disability Determination 
Services (DDS) in a claimant’s home state. It uses a definition 
of disability that (barring some amendments) dates back to 1974.
Incapacity is:
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the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which can be
expected to result in death, or which has lasted, or can be expected to last,
for a continuous period of at least 12 months.61
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As this makes clear, impairments must in the first instance
be medically determinable – occupational therapists and other
non-medical clinicians are only consulted after this criterion has
been met. While DDS can recommend a further ‘consultative
examination’ or speak to the claimant by phone, it must give
priority to evidence from the claimant’s treating physician,
although it can ask them for more detail. This is one of several
reasons why the system is beset with long delays.62 A public
outcry of an attempted tightening of eligibility in the 1980s also
means that DDS has to prove that there has been a medical
improvement prior to saying that someone is no longer entitled
to benefits.
Once impairment has been established, there are then two
ways of being found eligible for DI or SSI. First, the client’s
impairments are compared to a ‘listing of impairments’, which
details several hundred diagnoses and impairments considered
severe enough that the DDS simply assumes they limit work
activity. Other impairments or combinations of impairments can
also be considered equivalent to a listing if they produce the
same symptoms as a listed impairment. In the early years of the
programme the listings accounted for more than 90 per cent of
claims, but by the mid-2000s it had dropped to about half.
Alternatively, a claimant’s actual work capacity is directly
assessed. This is done through a ‘Residual Functional Capacity
Assessment’ (RFC), which establishes functional capacity (in a
way akin to the WCA), and then compares this to the claimant’s
relevant past work, and then against any work in the national
economy. Mirroring the Canadian test, it assesses whether
claimants ‘cannot, considering their age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
that exists in the national economy’ – age, education and work
experience being the same three factors singled out in Canada. It
also similarly separates these three characteristics from wider
labour market factors, noting that their assessment ignores
‘whether such work exists in the immediate area in which they
live, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for them, or whether
they would be hired if they applied for work’.63
Lessons for the UK
The American innovation is to use a structured tool to help
assess real-world incapacity. This was needed because the 
Social Security Administration had to prove that the claimant
can engage in work available somewhere in the national
economy, and they needed something that was defensible in
court. For many years they have used a large database of work
requirements in different occupations – called the Dictionary 
of Occupational Titles (DOT), and created for entirely 
different purposes – to justify which occupations are available to
people with which limitations; indeed, they even designed the
SI/SSI criteria around it. Yet the technical challenges in creating
a valid database should not be underestimated. DOT is now
outdated, and its replacement is not suitable for disability
assessment. A dedicated panel spent five years (2008–2012)
looking into this, and decided that a dedicated new Occupa-
tional Information Service database was needed, but Congress
reportedly baulked at the price, and a less expensive version is
currently being developed.
The US case confirms what we learnt from Canada, and
further shows that occupational databases can be used in real-
world assessments, even if this is a technically complex and
charged issue.
The Netherlands64
Incapacity benefits
Among benefit experts, there are two things that the Netherlands
is known for. The first is the ‘Dutch disease’, the high rate of
incapacity claims that developed in the 1980s followed by a
continuing series of reforms, anticipating the later rises and
responses seen in most other high-income countries. The second
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is the heavy incentivising of employers to rehabilitate their
employers – to the point that Dutch employers are responsible
for the first two years of their employees’ sickness claims, unless
they have a strong rehabilitation plan. The benefits system that
we describe therefore comes after this initial period of sickness,
much later in people’s sickness or disability trajectories than the
UK or most of the countries reviewed here. But beyond this, our
argument is that the Dutch system perhaps offers the most
important lessons for a real-world rethinking of the WCA.
From 2006, the Dutch system consists of three main
benefits:65
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· WGA (Werkhervatting Gedeeltelijk Arbeidsgeschikten), a benefit
for either partially disabled or temporarily disabled people, for a
maximum of 38 months
· follow-up benefit, a much less generous benefit after people’s
eligibility for WGA has expired
· IVA (Inkomensvoorziening Volledig Arbeidsongeschikten), a
relatively generous benefit with no time limits for people
considered to be permanently fully disabled, often for people
who have already claimed WGA for some time
Assessment of eligibility
One assessment seems to be carried out for all of these benefits,
which is undertaken in two stages. First, a doctor employed by
the social insurance agency completes a functional assessment of
the claimant, covering 28 different types of task required in
different occupations. Some tasks here are similar to the WCA,
but others cover more specialised functional capacities such as
tolerance of vibration or reactions to heat. The agency’s doctors
can (with the claimant’s consent) ask for information from the
treating doctor or claimant’s employer, and can hire a specialist;
there has been an increasing emphasis on establishing that the
limitations are caused by medical conditions rather than non-
medical factors. Over a third of claimants are said to have such
great impairments that they have ‘no lasting capacities left’, and
are awarded the benefit at this point.
For others, the impact of these limitations on potential
earnings is then assessed by a different person who is an expert
in occupational health. This expert has to find three types of job
that the claimant could do, given their limitations, education,
skills and work experience; if they cannot find three jobs then
the claimant is considered fully disabled. A further complexity
within the Dutch system – not one that would necessarily work
in the UK – is that it takes into account previous earnings, with 
a disabled person’s current earning capacity determined by
earnings in the middle of the three best-paying occupations 
that they can do. A person must have at least a 35 per cent
reduction in earnings capacity to be eligible for partial benefits,
and nearly half of applicants now are found ineligible for
disability benefits because their disability-related earnings
reduction is below this threshold.
Lessons for the UK
Like the Americans, the Dutch have a large, dedicated database
that helps the labour market expert match people’s functioning,
education, skills and work experience with the requirements of
different jobs. This system is called Claimbeoordelings- en
Borgingssysteem (CBBS), and contains up-to-date information
gained from on-site observations by labour experts. As of 2012 it
contained 7,000 observations across 250 major occupations in
the Netherlands; for each it lists 28 functional capacity demands
as well as the skills required to do the job, hours and working
patterns and so on. To reduce the costs of this exercise, the
system does not collect data on the other 1,000 occupations that
technically exist in the country, omitting rare occupations and
focusing more on lower-skilled occupations that a greater
proportion of people are qualified to do.
As in nearly every country, the Netherlands’ incapacity
assessment explicitly says that local labour demand – the
person’s actual ability to get these jobs – should not be taken
into account; this is a deliberate change in practice in response to
the so-called ‘Dutch disease’ of the 1980s and 1990s. But it is still
a real-world assessment as it considers what jobs a person with
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particular skills, qualifications and impairments can actually do.
It has not been beyond criticism – in its early days it was found
in court to be defensible but insufficiently transparent, verifiable
and testable – but since then it seems to have faded into the
background, a mark of success for an incapacity assessment.
While the Netherlands and the US share this idea of using a
database for real-world assessments, CBBS seems to offer the
more successful version at present.
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In the real world, incapacity is about whether someone’s
functional impairments interfere with their ability to get or keep
a job, given who they are. This definition of incapacity forces us
to think about what jobs normally involve; indeed, one of us has
elsewhere found that declining workplace autonomy – which
makes it harder to cope with impairments at work – partly
explains rising incapacity in Britain.66 It also forces us to think
about employers’ willingness to make exceptional changes for
disabled people, particularly as the WCA currently finds people
fit for work on the assumption that employers will make
significant adjustments (see chapter 2).
Our focus here, however, has been on how we assess real-
world incapacity, based on our review of incapacity assessment in
seven countries in the previous chapter. In this concluding
chapter, we draw together five lessons for a real-world rethinking
of the WCA in Britain, and then suggest a series of steps towards
delivering it in practice. We should stress that the nature of the
assessment is separate from how many people are considered
eligible for incapacity benefits, or how generous these benefits
are – a generous or stringent system can exist within each
principle of assessment, as the case studies have shown.
Lessons from other countries
Lesson 1 Real-world assessment is possible – and even
commonplace
In different ways, all of the countries in this review have a form
of ‘real-world assessment’. Often this begins with the same sort
of functional assessment as the WCA – but then goes beyond
this to look at whether people are actually incapacitated. This is
no surprise for the social democratic countries – we chose them
for the review for this reason – but it is striking that even the
other Anglo-Saxon welfare states have a greater consideration of
real-world factors than the UK. For example, Canada’s strict
system explicitly says that age, education and work experience
‘directly affect a person’s ability to work’, and are therefore
considered in their incapacity assessment.
This is not to say that all follow an identical method;
countries consider real-world factors in very different ways. For
example, the definitions of work capacity vary: some countries
ask whether people are able to work part time (New Zealand,
Australia); other countries look at the percentage reduction in
people’s earning capacity (Sweden, Netherlands); while
Denmark considers whether a person would be able to get a
subsidised ‘flex-job’. Some of the assessments also explicitly 
take into account individual factors such as education or age 
(eg Canada, Netherlands, Sweden) which affect people’s real-
world work capacity, while others do not. But it is simply 
not the case that real-world assessments are utopian and
unworkable; instead, it is the WCA that appears strange in an
international perspective.
Lesson 2 A standardised real-world assessment is possible
One approach to real-world assessment is to introduce a
discretionary system, as suggested for the UK by Professor
Richard Berthoud,67 and a little like the system used by some
countries. For example, people’s own doctors in New Zealand
are asked to decide whether the claimant is able to work 15 hours
per week, without a structured process to help them determine
this (most of the countries we studied make more use of people’s
treating doctor than the UK). Even in the UK, the WCA has
increasingly made use of discretionary ‘special’ or ‘exceptional’
circumstances (see chapter 2), and there is a move towards
personalised employment support and conditionality that
inevitably involves some element of discretion. This does not
necessarily mean that assessments are entirely outside the control
of policy makers; there are many ways of controlling discretion
in bureaucracies, as we see in New Zealand, Sweden and
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Denmark. But many people seem to think that it is indefensible
to have unstructured tests for benefit eligibility that work
differently in different regions (see chapter 2), and it is difficult
to ensure consistency in any such discretionary system.
However, it is also possible to marry standardisation with
an accurate, real-world assessment. The Netherlands and the US
both use databases of information on the various requirements of
different occupations (both functional and educational), which
are matched against the specific capacities and skills of the
claimant to produce a list of occupations that the claimant can
realistically perform. Such a system has two key advantages.
First, the claimant gets a clear message about why they are 
being found fit for work: it is because they are assessed as
capable of doing particular occupations, and does not deny 
that they have genuine limitations that may limit their ability 
to undertake other occupations. Second, this test has a much
stronger link to employment support than the WCA. By showing
which jobs the claimant would be capable of, and in what
circumstances, it provides the building blocks on which success-
ful return-to-work strategies can be devised (indeed, some sort of
vocational profiling and job matching is needed within many of
the most successful strategies for helping disabled people return
to work68).
Lesson 3 We can separate real-world incapacity from
unemployment
One of the challenges of real-world incapacity assessment is
separating incapacity from unemployment. As we said above,
there is no getting around this problem: in the real world
incapacity is intrinsically linked to employability, and attempts 
to avoid real-world factors such as the WCA are destined to fail
to measure incapacity accurately. In the face of this problem,
there are two ways in which most other countries have
nevertheless maintained a dividing line between unemployment
and incapacity.
First, even if non-medical factors are taken into account in
the assessment, many countries have emphasised that functional
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impairments still need to be caused by medical conditions –
known in the Netherlands as ‘the causality principle’. Canada
even goes as far as reviewing a variety of evidence to check that
non-employment is caused by medically linked impairments
rather than other factors. A striking exception to this exists in
Sweden, where people can be classified as having a ‘socio-
medical disability’ for having a non-medical disadvantage in the
labour market, such as being a migrant with poor Swedish
language skills. While we are definitely not recommending this
for the UK, it makes some sense in the context of the Swedish
system, where such groups can only be given suitable support if
classified as disabled.
Second, it is common to explicitly specify that local labour
demand is not taken into account in the assessment. This is
crucial; as we saw above, a previous UK minister has opposed a
real-world assessment on the mistaken assumption that this
inevitably means an inconsistent, ‘spatially-specific’ assessment
in different parts of the country. This is not the case; the
Canadian framework explicitly says that ‘we would not find one
[claimant] disabled because unemployment is high while the
other was not’, and the Australian, Dutch and American systems
are similarly unambiguous. These systems all consider real-world
factors in the sense that they look at which jobs a person could
realistically undertake, given their personal characteristics
(including non-medical factors like age and qualifications) – but
not whether are vacancies for these jobs at the present time. This
is often a deliberate change from what are perceived to be the
flaws in past practice.
Lesson 4 Unemployment benefits must also be a ‘safe place’ for
disabled people
Put simply, some genuinely disabled people will not be claiming
incapacity benefits in almost any system. As many as 11.5 million
working-age people have a long-term condition, with 6.5 million
counted as disabled under the Equality Act 2010,69 and many of
these people – together with others with shorter-lasting impair-
ments – face genuine disadvantages in the labour market, even if
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their disabilities are not sufficient for them to be classified as
entitled to incapacity benefits. There is a compelling logic
(discussed in chapter 2) for the existence of incapacity benefits,
and clearly those who are not realistically able to work should
receive these benefits. But despite this, the rest of the benefits
system must still be a ‘safe place’ for other disabled people in the
support that is given and (if this exists) in the conditionality that
is applied.
This is most critical in Australia and New Zealand, where
nearly all disabled people are expected to claim the general
unemployment benefit for the first two years of their
impairment. While our review did not focus on how
conditionality was being applied in different countries, we do
know that nearly half of Newstart Allowance claimants in
Australia are exempt from conditionality at any one time, many
of whom are sick or disabled. In these systems, long periods of
failing to find work are part of the eligibility criteria for the more
generous (and less conditional or unconditional) disability
benefit, as they are when moving from sickness to long-term
disability benefits in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands –
something Deborah Mabbett terms a ‘procedural approach’ to
incapacity assessment, and which does not appear to cause
sickness claimants to turn down jobs in these systems. It would
seem reasonable to treat long periods of worklessness on
unemployment benefits as evidence of incapacity among those
with impairments, rather than continually and forlornly seeking
to ‘activate’ them.
In contrast, the British system deals badly with health
problems among those claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA).
Jobcentre Plus advisers ‘have the flexibility to tailor condition-
ality’, according to the current minister, but a senior DWP civil
servant recently admitted that ‘not all Jobcentre advisers had
been aware of this’.70 It is therefore unsurprising that charities
and disability activists report examples of disabled people 
being (wrongly) told by job centres that they could not claim
JSA if they could not meet the conditionality requirements. 
This assumption that people found fit for work by the WCA
have no health barriers is particularly extreme when we consider
57
that a DWP-sponsored expert panel found that 83 per cent 
of those found fit for work would need ‘on average, two or 
three’ workplace adjustments (see chapter 2). While there are
promises that this will be improved under Universal Credit, JSA
is not yet a safe place for disabled people, and this makes the
WCA a higher-stakes and more traumatic assessment than it
needs to be.
Lesson 5 It is hard to evaluate the success of incapacity
assessments from other countries
We have written about ‘the lessons from other countries’ – but
we should stress that they are based on what other countries
show to be possible, and we have not proved empirically that
their assessments are successful (whether we take success to
mean accurate assessments, perceived legitimacy, or something
else). This is not because ‘success’ can be ignored, but because it
is almost impossible to know how successful other countries’
incapacity assessments are. It is extremely difficult to know even
if a country’s system as a whole achieves good outcomes for
disabled people; there are no trustworthy data telling us which
countries are successful in getting disabled people into work and
securing them against poverty (although the wider Rethinking
Incapacity project is trying to estimate this). But even if these
data did exist, then teasing out the role of the assessment itself
would be almost impossible. The OECD does present some
statistics on the accuracy of incapacity assessments, but this is
because of the pressures to produce some numbers, rather than
because these numbers are credible.71
To make matters even more difficult, to the extent that an
incapacity assessment is working well, then it will not attract any
attention, which makes it even harder to find any information
about it. We therefore are left to assume that the Dutch system of
structured incapacity assessment is more successful than the
American system, on the grounds that there are fierce debates in
the latter but little comment in the former – but it is impossible
to say whether this is due to the systems themselves, or because
of the delays, almost non-existent unemployment benefits and
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litigious culture surrounding the US system. It is also clear that
the high levels of incapacity claims in nearly all of the countries
here are a political issue, which reflects the wider structural
issues that lead so many people to be excluded from the labour
market in the early twenty-first century. No country feels it has
cracked the problem, and even if no other countries are currently
subject to the outcry over the WCA, there is nonetheless a
restless discontentment with many aspects of their incapacity
system in most countries.
Towards a new incapacity assessment
These five lessons offer us a starting point for rethinking the
WCA – yet further work is needed to turn them into a blueprint
for implementation. We therefore recommend that the new
government in May 2015 takes the following steps towards
setting up a new incapacity assessment:
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· Commit to replacing the WCA with a real-world incapacity assessment.
Further research will be useful to understand the nature of real-
world incapacity, and how disabled people’s wider circumstances
make it easier or harder for them to work. But even without this,
we know that there is no meaningful definition of incapacity that
is not based in the real world.
· Create a wide-ranging expert panel to develop the new incapacity test.
The US created an expert panel with expertise ranging from
psychometrics to law, just to develop the database underpinning
their system. And while we have not dwelt on this here,
‘disability’ is a general term for a wide variety of different
conditions and limitations, all of which need to be considered in
detail for a new system. The time and resources necessary to
replace the WCA should not be underestimated.
· Undertake study visits to key countries, particularly the US and the
Netherlands, to provide essential detail on how these systems work
in practice. This would also guard against false idols – New
Zealand introduced reforms based on a misunderstanding of the
UK’s successes, and it does not seem sensible to mirror their
misunderstandings in reverse.
· Look at how the public and other key groups respond to any proposals.
As Dr Paul Litchfield has said, a guiding principle of reform
must be that ‘any assessment should not only be fair but be
perceived as such’. Yet there is surprisingly little work on what
the public take to be a ‘fair’ incapacity system.
· Estimate the costs of a new assessment system – but also the savings that
it could generate. Introducing additional or longer assessments
would have a cost, but we already collect much information on
real-world incapacity in order to provide decent employment
support (as Scope has noted72), and the costs of a fuller initial
assessment would therefore be counterbalanced by savings
elsewhere. We are also likely to achieve better employment
outcomes from an improved assessment, not least because the
widespread distrust of the WCA encourages people to ‘hunker
down’ on benefits rather than risk experimenting with work.73
· Involve disabled people from the outset. Any new system needs to be
developed in collaboration with the many different groups that
represent disabled people, ranging from established disability
charities to grassroots movements – learning from the way that
NDIS was developed in Australia (see footnote 51).
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The next three years of the Rethinking Incapacity project
(described on page 11) will contribute to some of these steps. The
project will investigate the role of non-medical factors in
incapacity in Britain and across Europe. It will explore public
opinion on incapacity, using a new survey and deliberative
workshops with key groups. And it will try and show which
countries do better and worse in getting disabled people into
work, overcoming the limitations that make existing data
unreliable. But academic research can only do so much in the
absence of a wider appetite for change.
There is wide agreement that we have pushed the WCA as
far as we can in making minor tweaks and changing provider,
and a major reform is now needed to restore the system to
effectiveness and legitimacy. Our view is that this reform should
be based on a real-world idea of incapacity – not for political
reasons, but simply because this is what incapacity is, what most
people understand it to be, and what disabled people need to
deal with in the real world. This pamphlet has shown that 
real-world incapacity is a realistic path, and we hope that the
sorely needed review to overhaul the WCA will similarly begin 
in the real world of incapacity, rather than in the false dream of
the WCA.
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The Work Capability Assessment (WCA) – which assesses
eligibility for the main out-of-work disability benefit, Employment
and Support Allowance – is widely seen to be failing. Part of the
problem is how the assessments have been delivered, but even
after Atos is replaced by Maximus, the root problems of the WCA
will remain: the WCA simply does not assess claimants’ capability
for work. 
The main alternative that has been suggested is a ‘real-world
assessment’. This looks at whether a person could actually get or
keep work, given their impairments and given who they are.
However, the Minister for Employment raised concerns about
their fairness, while the official reviewer of the WCA felt that there
was little evidence of what such a test might look like in practice.
This report – the first from the ESRC-funded Rethinking
Incapacity project – meets this challenge by looking at how 
seven other countries assess incapacity. It finds several lessons 
for the UK:
· Real-world assessment is possible – even commonplace
· A standardised real-world test is possible
· We can separate real-world incapacity from unemployment
· Unemployment benefits must also be a ‘safe place’ for
disabled people
It concludes with a series of recommendations for how the new
government in May 2015 can take the steps towards a new
incapacity assessment. Our view is that this should be based on a
real-world idea of incapacity – not for political reasons, but
because it better reflects everyday realities.
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